






Quantitative Measures of Financial Sector Reform 






















Quantitative Measures of Financial Sector Reform  
in the Arab Countries 





Arab countries like other developing countries have embarked since the early 
1990s on financial sector reforms. The purpose of this study is to review and analyze the 
financial reform experience of the Arab countries after more than ten year of the 
implementation of these reforms.  
 
Financial reforms have already brought about significant improvement in 
monetary and credit aggregates in many Arab countries. Financial sector reform has 
certainly had a noticeable impact on the cost of intermediation: real interest rates and 
gross interest margins. However, there is scope for even more improvements over the 
next years as competition enhancing measures and administrative costs reduction 
interventions are adopted. Moreover,  the financial sector in Arab countries caters mainly 
to the public sector. There is a need for the monetary authorities to strengthen and 
promote private sector activities and ensure that the public sector does not crowd it out.  
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I. Introduction 
In the last decade, Arab countries, especially those of the Gulf, made 
significant progress in building a modern financial sector. Arab countries 
have embarked on economic and financial reforms in recognition that 
economic growth and stability are often associated with increasing financial 
deepening and in response to the need to quickly adopt to rapid 
globalization. For the most part, the financial and monetary authorities have 
implemented financial sector liberalization programs. These programs have 
included deregulating, interest rates liberalization and the gradual opening 
up of the financial sector for foreign participation, privatization of banks and 
other financial institutions and increasing competition.  
The purpose of this paper is to review and analyze the financial sector 
reform experience of the Arab countries during the last decade. However, it 
has been recognized that the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries are 
faced with a different set of challenges than the rest of the Arab countries 
and thus the analysis here distinguishes between two main groups of Arab 
countries. These groups are the diversified Arab economies, i.e., Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen and the oil-
based economies, i.e. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE.  
The paper starts by presenting a framework through which the 
financial reform experience of Arab counties can be reviewed and analyzed.  
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The framework's focus is on the design and sequencing of specific measures 
that, together, constitute the optimal financial reform package. To set the 
stage for a discussion of reform in the Arab countries, section III presents 
the quantitative indicators of these countries' financial sectors while 
providing a comparison with a selected group of reforming developing 
countries (Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Philippines). The final section 
concludes by highlighting areas in the Arab countries where additional 
reforms are still needed. 
 
II. The Financial Reform Experience of Developing Countries  
Since the mid-1970s, many developing countries have been 
implementing financial liberalization programs. A study conducted by Bisat, 
Johnston, and sundararajan (1992) examined in detail the experience of five 
countries with financial sector reform and liberalization: Argentina (1976-
81), Chile (1974-80), Indonesia (1983-88), Korea 1980-88) and the 
Philippines (1980-84). Furthermore, Fry (1988) presented a general review 
of issues of financial reform. The interaction between economic growth and 
financial sector reform is presented by Sundararajan (1985 and 1987), and 
Gertler (1988). This section attempts to summarize the main lessons from 
these developing countries' experience, focusing on six topics: 
intermediation approach; monetary and credit directions; monetary policy; 
prudential supervision measures; status of competition; and the role of stock 
markets. 
 
1. Intermediation  Approach 
Real interest rates are likely to become a more important policy 
instrument in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period. For the  
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most part, credit expansion that continues for a long period after reform 
could threaten macroeconomic stability through putting pressure on price 
levels and the external accounts imbalance. This would occur if real interest 
rates were negative in the post-reform period, as this would encourage a 
more rapid growth of credit and slower growth of deposits. While negative 
real interest rates are common in pre-reform periods, their impact on credit 
tends to be limited by application of direct credit controls. 
 In contrast, if positive real interest rates were maintained, the growth 
of credit would slow down compared to the initial post-reform period. This 
would be emphasized by a rise in the growth rate of deposits that would also 
react favorably to the development of financial instruments and institutions, 
and to banks becoming more efficient deposit users following the reduction 
in the central bank role as liquidity provider. The above analysis strongly 
suggests that a necessary prerequisite for successful reform is the adoption 
of prudent macroeconomic policies that would result in positive real interest 
rates. 
Financial liberalization tends to affect the cost of funds in complicated 
ways. First, the removal of interest rate controls allows banks to price credits 
and risks more appropriately and this may cause an increase in interest rate 
margins since controlled lending rates were usually set too low in the pre-
reform period.  Second, risk premiums tend to rise in the post-reform period 
as banks significantly expand their loan portfolio to new borrowers with 
unconventional risks. Thirdly, upward pressure is placed on the gross 
interest margin since competition in credit markets increases only slowly 
relative to that in the deposit markets. Against those factors, financial 
liberalization also tends to put downward pressure on the cost of funds. First, 
reserve requirements are normally lowered as part of the reform package that  
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reduces the cost differences between deposit and lending rates. Second, 
competition is increased through the reduction of barriers to entry.  
In conclusion, evidence from the experience of developing countries 
suggests that reforms tend to expand banks' gross lending margins. 
However, this can be corrected by a strengthening of bank supervision, by 
further reducing the reserve requirements, and by a rapid implementation of 
competition-enhancing measures. 
 
2.  Monetary and credit Directions 
Financial reform is usually associated with increases in the ratios of 
money, financial assets and credit to the private sector, to GDP, while the 
ratio of currency to deposits fall following the reforms. Thus, the effect of 
financial liberalization on the behavior of the key monetary and credit 
aggregates needs to be taken into account in setting monetary targets in the 
post-reform period. 
Financial liberalization also tends to be followed by a period in which 
credit growth exceeds the growth of deposits with financial institutions. This 
phenomenon can be explained as follows. In the pre-reform period, both 
deposits and credit tend to fall. The decline in the former reflects a voluntary 
portfolio response to financial repression. In the post-reform-period there is 
a gradual portfolio adjustment by depositors to the new liberal financial 
situation. In contrast, credit growth in the pre-reform period is constrained 
by direct controls with an excess demand for credit. Once the direct controls 
are removed, financial institutions respond by meeting the excess demand 
for credit and credit expands rapidly. This has the impact of increasing 
imbalances, and putting pressure on prices and the country's external 
accounts. The credit boom can pose a threat to economic stability; its  
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appropriate management is a crucial element of successful financial 
liberalization.   
 
3.  Monetary policy 
Financial liberalization requires the ability to manage interest rates 
and liquidity and credit aggregates through market-oriented instruments of 
monetary policy, i.e., indirect instruments, rather than through direct 
administrative fixing of various interest rates. However, in the immediate 
post-reform period, there is a space for using direct controls which would 
line up credit growth with the otherwise lagging growth of bank deposits. 
Therefore, while there is a need for an early implementation of indirect 
monetary instruments, credit ceilings may be used on a temporary basis, and 
so long as they are supported by positive real interest rates. 
Money markets require an active involvement of the central bank in 
order to ensure the existence of a reciprocal market in bank reserves. In 
doing so, the central bank should switch gradually from being the principal 
market maker to creating and supporting the financial deepening of the 
market. In this capacity, the central bank should withdraw (or inject) 
reserves at own initiative in anticipation of surpluses (and deficits) emerging 
in the market while leaving market participants to make their own decisions. 
Thus, indirect momentary instruments are essential for the development of 
money markets and the deepening of financial markets. 
 
4.  Prudential Supervision Measures 
The soundness of the banking system has implications on how to 
manage the reform process. This is because a system that is burdened with 
rolling over of loans of weak firms or large nonperforming loans cannot  
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easily change lending priorities to new venues and investments. In addition, 
higher interest rates on deposits will compound the cash flow problems, and 
higher lending rates only deteriorate the bad debt problem. Weak institutions 
tend to also become a greater source of pressure on central bank resources 
thereby affecting monetary policy. 
More importantly, financial reforms themselves may weaken the 
banking sector. For instance, the removal of credit restrictions before proper 
credit approval processes are put in place may result in an increase in 
lending to more risky projects and to new activities. This is particularly 
critical if, as in the developing countries, (implicit or explicit) deposit 
guarantees exist which leave investors largely indifferent as to where they 
place their deposits. 
Thus, financial liberalization in some developing countries 
implementing financial reforms was followed by a financial crisis. It should 
therefore be emphasized that financial sector and monetary authorities face 
difficult constraints and may lose their effectiveness if a significant part of 
financial institutions have sizeable nonperfoming loans and face constant 
cash flow problems. Therefore, measures to deal with banking sector 
problems would need to be put in place before financial reform starts. In 
addition, banks need to be encouraged to improve their internal credit 
assessment, risk appraisal systems and strengthen their accounting and 
disclosure practices. 
 
5.  Status of Competition  
The banking systems in countries embarking upon financial reform 
are usually characterized by oligopoly market structures. As a result, the 
speed of adjustment of deposit and lending rates to changes in monetary  
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policy conduct is often slow, and the margin between deposit and lending 
rates also tends to adjust slowly. While enhancing competition and 
interest rate liberalization have a positive impact on financial 
competition, the impact tends to happen with a lag.  
 
6.  The Role of Stock Markets 
A key question that always arises during the financial reform process 
concerns what sequence to pursue when developing non-banking financial 
markets. The international experience appears to suggest that money markets 
and the markets for short-term instruments such as treasury bills and 
bankers' acceptances should be developed prior to long-term markets. This is 
because the development of well-capitalized dealers in securities is easier in 
short-term instruments than in long-term instruments such as shares and 
other stocks. The capital markets sophistication and exchange skills 
developed through short-term instruments can then be translated into long-
term instruments over time. 
The development of capital markets, within a sound regulatory 
framework, requires a number of structural reforms including; an effective 
privatization plan; a macroeconomic environment that is conducive to 
increasing the private sector share in the economy; and the strengthening of 
market forces through improving information flows, accounting standards, 
property rights, pricing efficiency, and tax reform. Finally, political stability 
is vital for the development of sound capital markets. 
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III. Quantitative Assessment of Financial Sector Reform in Arab 
Countries 
Prior to examining the financial sector policies of the Arab countries, 
this section provides a quantitative assessment for these countries during the 
1991-2000 period. The section considers four sets of indicators relating to 
interest rates; monetary aggregates; credit aggregates; the capital market and 
other related aspects of the financial sector. Furthermore, the analysis 
examines how the indicators behaved following liberalization and how they 
compare to levels prevailing in a set of developing countries that are 
advanced in the process of financial liberalization: Argentina, Chile, 
Thailand and the Philippines. 
This section adopts a two-tier classification of the Arab countries 
surveyed in this paper. The first category includes the diversified Arab 
economies such as Lebanon which has historically possessed a liberal and 
open financial sector and countries that are, to varying degrees, advanced in 
the process of financial sector reform such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. In addition, it also includes Algeria, Syria and Yemen--countries 
where the financial sector is, or until recently was heavily administratively 
controlled and/or was part of a planning apparatus that mobilized financial 
resources and centrally allocated them to prescribed projects. While Algeria 
and Yemen have recently embarked on a financial sector reform effort, Syria 
is currently in the process of initiating its own financial reform program. 
  The second group includes all the GCC countries as these countries 
have already completed most of the crucial stages of liberalization and 
financial reform, and unlike the other Arab counties, their financial systems 
are not encumbered with distortions. 
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A) Diversified Arab Economies 
1. Interest Rates 
Two indicators related to interest rates and the intermediation aspects 
of the financial sector operations are considered (see Bisat, 1996). The level 
of real interest rates demonstrates the allocative efficiency of financial 
resource use. Gross interest rate margins (i.e. the difference between deposit 
and lending rates) point to the level of financial sector competition. 
In general, real interest rates in most of the diversified Arab 
economies were negative before embarking on financial reform, by the mid-
1990s all of the Arab countries showed positive signs (see Table 1A&B). In 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon interest rate liberalization 
was followed by relatively high real interest rates; however, these rates have 
been falling over the last few years. In Syria and Yemen, banks are still 
adjusting to the recently liberalized financial environment and therefore, 
temporarily showed a negative sign for Yemen or high real interest rate as 
the case for Syria. Furthermore, real interest rates in diversified Arab 
economies are slightly higher than those prevailing in other developing 
counties.  
Gross interest rate margins in diversified Arab economies have been 
declining over time indicating an increase in competition within the financial 
market. Only two countries are exception namely, Lebanon and Morocco 
were the gross interest rate margins are higher than those prevailing in other 
Arab countries and even those prevailing in other developing countries. This 





Table 1A. Interest Rate Indicators; 1992-2000 
(In percent) 
 
  1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
Real Deposit Rates 
Algeria  -15.8 -6.6  -3  -4.2  -0.3  5.5  4 
Egypt  -3.6 0.5 -2.2  6  8.2 8.4 7.4 
Jordan  -0.7 0.2  2  5.9 4.8 7.6 6.2 
Lebanon  -46.8 5.0  -2.1  3.3  7.3  2.5  5.5 
Morocco  3.5 2.4 2.0 2.3 4.5 5.6 3.3 
Syria  -2.7 -6.1 -3.2 -3.2 2.9  5.9  7.1 
Tunisia  3.6 0.5 4.9 3.2 3.5 3.0 2.6 
Yemen  -25.6 -23.1  -6.3  8  0.3  7.3  -1 
Argentina  -6.5  3.7           1.9  0.7 
Chile  2.5  5.1           3.3  4.9 
Philippines  4.9  0.3           1.4  1.9 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
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Table 1B. Interest Rate Indicators; 1992-2000 
(In percent) 
 
  1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Gross Interest Rate Margin 
Algeria  10.0  7.5 4.5 2.8 3.5  3  2.8 
Egypt  3.6 4.6  5  4  3.7 3.8 3.8 
Jordan  6.5 5.8 2.8 0.8 1.6 4.0 4.8 
Lebanon  23.1  8.4 9.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 
Morocco  10 8.2  7  9  10 10 9.8 
Syria  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Tunisia  6.9 6.9 5.4 6.0 4.9 3.5 4.5 
Yemen  5.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 3.4 3.8  5 
Argentina  8.6  6.1           6.0  4.4 
Chile  5.7  4.4           5.3  5.7 
Philippines  5.2  6.3           5.1  4.5 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
 
 
2- Monetary Aggregates 
The traditional measures of financial deepening are the ratio of 
currency to deposits, the ratio of M2 to GDP and the ratio of M1 to M2. While 
the first two ratios are intended to demonstrate the depth of the market; the 
third ratio provides an indicator of the importance of long-term banking and 
the degree of sophistication in the financial market. (See Table 2A,B & C).   
The currency to deposit ratios are lowest in Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Jordan, and to a leaser degree in Morocco indicating fairly sophisticated 
financial markets and public confidence in the banks. The ratios for Egypt and  
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Lebanon are in line with those of the developed countries but for Tunisia; 
Jordan and Morocco, ratios are slightly higher than other developing 
countries. Nevertheless, these levels represent a significant improvement from 
the level prevailing at the beginning of the decade and suggest a post-
liberalization improvement in financial intermediation. In Algeria, Syria and 
Yemen the currency to deposit ratios are high which is common in many 
developing counties in economic transition in the periods before and 
immediately after implementing financial reform measures. In the case of 
Algeria and Yemen, the higher ratios are indicative of the presence of the 
monetary overhang phenomenon in the financial market as both price and 
import controls are applied combined with expansionary financial policies. 
For Syria, however, the ratio predominantly reflects a cash-based society and 
a lack of sophistication in the financial market.   
The monetization ratio, M2 to GDP, is higher in Jordan and Lebanon 
than the rest of both other developing countries and other diversified Arab 
economies and clearly demonstrates a deepened financial sector. Egypt, 
Morocco and Syria’s monetization ratios are relatively lower but remain quite 
high when compared with the levels prevailing in other developing countries. 
This is mainly indicative of an advanced deposit banking system in these 
countries. Moreover, the monetization ratios for Tunisia, Algeria and Yemen 
are generally lower than both other developing countries and other diversified 
Arab countries, which is also a trend common in many developing counties in 
economic transition in the periods before and/or immediately after 
implementing financial reform measures and it also reflects the lack of new 
and innovative forms of financial savings.  
Furthermore, the M2 to GDP ratio in Algeria has been declining 
steadily during the period reflective of the unstable political environment. The  
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long-run mobilization ratio, M1 to M2, is very low in Lebanon and Egypt and 
to a lesser extent in Jordan. In these countries this is clearly indicative of a 
well-developed banking sector and illustrates the depth of the financial sector 
in each of these countries. In all other reforming Arab countries, the M1 to M2 
ratios are relatively higher than those prevailing in other developing countries 
which indicates less developed financial sector even though these ratios are 
generally declining over the time period. This suggests that these countries 
need to further develop their banking sector as they realize the full impact of 
interest rate liberalization including the effect of maturity differentiation 
among depositors. 
 
Table 2A. Monetary Indicators; 1992-2000                 (%) 
 
  1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Currency to Deposit Ratio 
Algeria  41.2 35.8 52.0 50.8 48.3 47.3 46.2 
Egypt  10.8 11.4 16.2 16.6 17.3 18.1 17.2 
Jordan  31.5 25.6 25.1 24.1 21.7 22.7 22.9 
Lebanon  7.2 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 
Morocco  34.7 32.0 32.7 27.0 26.4 48.3 25.0 
Syria  60.0 73.3 81.2 92.5 87.7 64.6 73.3 
Tunisia  35.7 22.4 20.7 18.7 18.9 18.9 18.3 
Yemen  97.7  94.5 103.9 93.9  86.1  89.9 80.4 
Argentina  32.9  28.4           23.4  22.9 
Chile  9.0  8.8           9.1  9.0 
Philippines  17.9  14.1           11.1  11.7 





Table 2B. Monetary Indicators; 1992-2000             (%) 
 
  1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
M2 to GDP Ratio 
Algeria  53  40.5 35.6 39.2 46.1 42.7 40.9 
Egypt  75.2 74.2 79.0 77.9 78.9 77.4 77.6 
Jordan  120 111.7  95.3 98.4 96.2 110 112 
Lebanon  125  126.9 125.6 119.5 125.4 122.3  127 
Morocco  60.4 63.2 62.2 72.5 71.5 51.6 58.9 
Syria  59.2 62.4 64.1 65.1 62.3 59.7 60.2 
Tunisia  43.1 38.9 40.1 42.7 43.6 45.1 45.7 
Yemen  32.4 33.8 31.7 34.6 41.3 35.8 37.5 
Argentina  13.7  10.6           17.6  19.6 
Chile  37.7  39.0           39.4  41.5 
Philippines  36.2  45.6           52.1  55.8 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.   
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Table 2C. Monetary Indicators; 1992-2000             (%) 
 
  1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
M1 to M2 Ratio 
Algeria  78.4 64.9 64.4 62.2 63.8 60.6 60.2 
Egypt  25.7 22.9 24.7 24.4 26.5 25.3 23.8 
Jordan  41.5 33.8 32.3 31.8 29.7 28.2 29.9 
Lebanon  12.5  6.8 6.1 5.6 5.1 5.0 4.9 
Morocco  77.3 72.9 72.4 72.2 73.4 60.8 73.9 
Syria  79.9 78.2 64.3 69.1 67.5 66.1 65.5 
Tunisia  47.9 48.2 46.5 45.1 45.9 44.9 43.2 
Yemen  68.7 61.8 59.0 56.4 54.6 55.2 52.6 
Argentina  36.6  33.3           41.2  42.1 
Chile  16.1  13.9           12.9  12.4 
Philippines  24.0  20.7           17.3  16.8 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
3- Credit Aggregates  
  The credit aggregates indicators utilized here are the private sector’s 
credit as a percent of GDP, Credit to the public sector to GDP and the 
monetary authority credit to the financial sector as a percent of total financial 
sector credit (see Table 3A, B & C). The first indicator shows the banking 
system’s orientation to the private sector and the extent to which domestic 
regulations constrain credit and thus the level of activities in the private 
sector. It also reflects the importance of the private sector in the economy and 
degree of success of obtaining its credit needs.  
Credit to private sector ratio in Tunisia is the highest among the eight 
Arab countries followed by Jordan and Morocco. Those countries’ ratios are 
in line with those prevailing in other developing countries. In Lebanon and  
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Egypt, the ratio is about 50 to 60 percent but points still to the impact of 
crowding out of the private sector by the public sector despite the well-
developed banking sector and the liberalization of credit policies. In particular 
in Egypt, this ratio improved dramatically in the last decade but there is still 
plenty of room for improvement. In Algeria, Syria and Yemen, the credit to 
private sector ratios are extremely low indicating a weak private sector role in 
the economy and low reliance on credit provided by the banking sector.  
    The credit to public sector ratio mainly tells the other side of the story 
of the first indicator, credit to private sector. However, it essentially point out 
the dominance of the public sector in the economic activities. In Tunisia the 
credit to public sector is the lowest, followed by Jordan and to lesser extent 
Morocco, which suggests an advanced privatization process and a more 
conservative fiscal perspective in these countries. In Lebanon, the credit to 
public sector amounted to about half of all the credit provided by the banking 
system despite the near absence of the public sector in the Lebanese economy. 
This is mainly associated with the persistence of large public debt due to a 
chronic budget deficit. In the remainder of the diversified Arab economies, the 
ratios have fallen dramatically in the last decade but there is large room for 
improvement, especially in countries like Egypt, Morocco and Syria.  
    The degree of reliance on monetary authorities by the financial sector 
is assessed by the ratio of credit provided by the central bank to local financial 
institutions to total credit. Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia show 
a low and decreasing ratios that is indicative of a low level of reliance on 
central bank for their operations. These ratios are a bit higher in Algeria and 
very high in Syria. In Syria it was increasing over the time period, indicating 
that more than two thirds of Syria’s financial sector credit is financed by the 
central bank.  
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Table 3A. Credit Indicators; 1992-2000                (%) 
  1992 1995  1996  1997 1998  1999  2000 
Credit to Private/Total Credit 
Algeria  9.1 10.7 13   9.3 10.1  10.9 - 
Egypt  24 45.3  49.8   53.6 56.9  59.8  59.2 
Jordan  58  78.3   81.7   84.5 79.8  82.5  84.6 
Lebanon  51  66.3   61.2   56.8 54.8  54.5  50.2 
Morocco  22.3   54.5   56.4   58.1 60.1  63.8  64.2 
Syria  9.6  23.2 24.8 26.5  27.3 29.6 33.7 
Tunisia  49.5 96.1  96.9  95.2 95.4  93.4  90.3 
Yemen  7.4  11.0 11.5 11.8  17.6 17.5 26.9 
Argentina  15.2  16.5           18.9  20.2 
Chile  45.4  48.5           49.3  50.7 
Philippines  20.6  29.1           38.7  39.4 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
Table 3B. Credit Indicators; 1992-2000     (%) 
  1992 1995  1996  1997 1998  1999  2000 
Credit to Public/Total Credit 
Algeria  60.8 89.3 87   90.7 89.9  89.1  - 
Egypt  70.4 54.7  50.2   46.4 43.1  40.2  40.8 
Jordan  35   21.7   18.3   15.5 20.2  17.5  15.4 
Lebanon  29.6   33.7   38.8   43.2 45.2  45.5  49.8 
Morocco  27.7   45.5   44.6   41.9 39.9  36.2  35.8 
Syria  48.7 76.8  75.2  73.5 72.7  70.4  66.3 
Tunisia  7.1  3.9 3.1 4.8  4.6 6.6 9.7 
Yemen  87.2 89.0  88.5  88.2 82.4  82.5  73.1 
Argentina  7.0  7.1           9.3  10.9 
Chile  13.4  7.8           6.5  7.2 
Philippines  0.5  15.8           20.1  22.3 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.   
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Table 3C. Credit Indicators; 1992-2000              (%) 
 
  1992 1995  1996  1997 1998  1999  2000 
Credit from Central Bank/Total Credit 
Algeria  12.5 19.6  24.4   18.8 17.8  19.5  - 
Egypt  5.4 1.3  1.1   1.0 0.9  1.2  1.0 
Jordan  12.6   3.2   2.8   3.0 2.6  2.4  2.3 
Lebanon  2.3   1.8   0.5   0.3 0.9  1.0  1.6 
Morocco  2.0   0.7  1 .4   0.4 1.2  0.4  2.2 
Syria  24.1 38.1  44.6  49.5 50.8  58.8  68.8 
Tunisia  14.3 9.2 1.6 1.1  1.0 0.6 2.4 
Yemen  -  - - -  - - - 
Argentina  46.4  37.1           43.7  45.5 
Chile  29.9  22.4           19.8  20.2 
Philippines  8.1  1.4           2.0  3.1 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
 
4- Stock Markets  
   Capital markets in diversified Arab countries are relatively new and 
generally small when compared with other developing countries.  The 
Egyptian equity market is the largest with a capitalization of about 29 US$ 
billion, followed by Morocco and Jordan (see Table 4A & B).  However, 
Amman’s equity market comes first with respect to capitalization to GDP 
ratio, about 60 percent followed by Morocco and Egypt. Furthermore, value 
traded in diversified Arab countries’ equity markets is generally modest with 
the Egyptian market taking the lead followed by Morocco.  The number of 
listed companies is on the rise but this was not reflected in the value traded, 
indicating that although listed, their shares were not necessarily traded in the 
market.   
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Table 4A. Capital Market Indicators; 1992-2000 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1997 2000 
 
Market Capitalization in billions of US$ 
Egypt  3.3 3.8 4.3  20.8  21.9 
Jordan  3.4 4.9 4.5 5.4 5.8 
Morocco  1.9 2.7 4.4  12.2  13.7 
Tunisia  0.8 1.0 2.6 2.3 2.6 
       
Emerging markets       
Argentina  18.6 44.0 36.9     
Chile  29.6 44.6 68.2     
Thailand  58.3 130.5 131.5     
 
Market Capitalization as a percent of GDP 
Egypt  7.9 8.1 8.3  20.8  23.2 
Jordan  66.2 87.4 75.3 77.4 79.4 
Morocco  6.7 10.1 14.2 36.8 43.2 
Tunisia  5.2  6.9 16.5 12.2 12.7 
       
Emerging markets       
Argentina  8.2 17.2 13.1 17.8   
Chile  72.0 102.2 125.7  93.8   
Thailand  56.4 108.5  91.8  99.2   
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
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Table 4B. Capital Market Indicators; 1992-2000 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1997 2000 
 
Value Trade in millions of US$ 
Egypt  300 170 360 600 690 
Jordan  1,310  1,380 620 770 940 
Morocco  0 1000  790  1,070  1,840 
Tunisia  0 0  300  970  1,730 
       
Emerging markets       
Argentina  15679 10339 11371       
Chile  2029 2797 5263       
Thailand  72060 86934 80188       
 
Number of Domestic Companies Listed 
Egypt  656 674 700 760 820 
Jordan  103 101  95 139 152 
Morocco  62 65 61 49 54 
Tunisia  17 19 21 34 44 
       
Emerging markets       
Argentina  175 180 156       
Chile  245 263 279       
Thailand  305 347 389       










II- GCC Countries 
The GCC countries have a fairly large number of banks with an 
extensive network of branches. Banks in the GCC countries are financially 
strong and well capitalized, (Jbili, Galbis and Bisat, 1996). In 2000, the 
Saudi American Bank was the largest Arab bank with assets exceeding 25 
US$ billion. Most of the banks in GCC are family-owned, with modest 
government equity participation and a large number of specialized banks are 
fully owned by the government. Moreover, the GCC countries have an open 
economic system with free movement of capital and exchange rate regimes, 
which are pegged to the US dollar. This institutional setting has implications 
for the conduct and the effectiveness of monetary policy, which is geared 
toward maintaining stability of the local currency against the US Dollar. 
This section presents a review of the structure and key indicators of financial 
systems in the GCC countries.    
1. Interest rates 
The same two indicators related to interest rates are also utilized here, 
namely, the level of real interest rates, which demonstrates the allocative 
efficiency of financial resource use and the gross interest rate margins (i.e. 
the difference between deposit and lending rates) which point to the level of 
financial sector competition.  
Because of the region’s low inflation rate, real interests rate have 
generally been positive but a bit higher than the real interest rates prevailing 
in some of the diversified Arab countries and other developing countries (see 
Table 5A & B). While most of the GCC countries maintained restrictive 
regulations on nominal interest rates in the past, in the 1990s most GCC 
countries have been removing these regulations and market forces now 
largely determine interest rates. Nevertheless, some restrictions remain in a  
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few countries, such as a ceiling on deposit interest rates and caps on lending 
rates or on consumer loans.  
On the other hand, the gross interest rate margins in GCC countries 
were smaller in comparison to diversified Arab countries, ranging from 1 to 
3 percent except for Bahrain where there is a wider margin of about 7 
percent.          
Table 5A. Interest Rate Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000      (%) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Real Deposit Rates 
Bahrain  3.8 4.7 2.8 5.1  -1  6.9 
Kuwait  3.1 2.5 5.3 6.1 2.7 3.9 
Oman  6.2 6.8 7.2 9.3 7.7 8.7 
Qatar  1.0 -.9 3.6 3.7 4.1 7.2 
Saudi Arabia  3.9 4.3 5.6 6.5 7.2 7.5 
United Arab Emirates  - - - - - - 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
 
Table 5B. Interest Rate Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000         (%) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Gross Interest Rate Margin 
Bahrain  6.7 7.3 7.0 7.2 7.1 6.8 
Kuwait  2.4 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.8 3.0 
Oman  1.9 2.4  2  1.6 2.2 2.5 
Qatar  1.4 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Saudi Arabia  - - - - - - 
United Arab Emirates  - - - - - - 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.   
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2- Monetary Aggregates 
As illustrated before, the conventional measures of financial 
deepening are the ratio of currency to deposits, the ratio of M2 to GDP and the 
ratio of M1 to M2. While the first two ratios are intended to demonstrate the 
depth of the market; the third ratio provides an indication of the importance of 
long-term banking and the degree of sophistication in the financial market in 
GCC countries. (See Table 6A, B & C). 
The currency to deposit ratios are low in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the 
UAE and to a lesser degree in Oman and Saudi Arabia indicating fairly 
sophisticated financial markets and public confidence in the GCC banking 
system. Oman and Saudi Arabia ratios are in line with other developing 
countries, however, their levels represent a significant improvement from the 
level prevailing at the beginning of the decade and suggest a post-
liberalization improvement in financial intermediation.  
Moreover, the GCC countries are well monetized, the ratio of money 
supply, M2, to GDP is high, ranging between 50 to 80 percent, and have been 
relatively stable over the time period reflecting the financial sector success in 
attracting deposits. The high degree of monetization and low ratio of currency 
to deposits are all a testament to the increased confidence in banks and the 
ability of the financial sector to provide advanced consumer services and 
utilize state of the art technologies such as ATMs, credit and debt cards, tele-
banking services and online banking. Such technologies have been supported 
by advanced instant computerized payment and settlement mechanisms 
(Eltony & Al-Mutairi, 2000).  
  Furthermore, the GCC banking sector has also been successful in 
mobilizing longer-term financial assets as evidenced by the low ratio of M1  
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to M2. This also gives reinforces the previous result of increasing public 
confidence in the GCC financial sector. 
 
Table 6A. Monetary Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000, (%) 
 
  1995 1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 
Currency to Deposit Ratio 
Bahrain  7.8 7.5   7.1 5.3  6.3  6.0 
Kuwait  4.4   5.1   4.7 4.8  6.1  5.4 
Oman  18.5   16.5   13.5  12.9 18.8 19.2 
Qatar  8.2   7.7   7.8 6.9  7.1  6.2 
Saudi Arabia  29   25.1   25.2  24.1 27.9 23.8 
United Arab Emirates  8.5 8.4  8.4  9.1 10.3 8.6 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
 
Table 6B. Monetary Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000      (%) 
 
  1995  1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 
M2 to GDP Ratio 
Bahrain  65.8 65.1   67.4  80.8 78.6 79.2 
Kuwait  93.1   78.8   84.1  97.6 84.6 70.4 
Oman  28.5   27.8   33.4  39.4 37.8 38.2 
Qatar  62.9   59.6   52.5  62.5 58.5 54.6 
Saudi Arabia  50.4   48.9   49.7  58.7 56.4 48.9 
United Arab Emirates  55.3  53.1 52.3  57.8 55.4 58.7 




Table 6C. Monetary Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000              (%) 
  1995  1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 
M1 to M2 Ratio 
Bahrain  22.9 22.5   21.6  19.5 21.8 20.7 
Kuwait  16.1   17.0   16.4  15.1 17.9 17.9 
Oman  31.2   30.8   27.0  23.7 22.5 22.8 
Qatar  20.0   19.8   19.1  18.1 16.1 15.5 
Saudi Arabia  51.9   51.4   51.9  49.7 52.0 52.6 
United Arab Emirates  25.6  25.6 26.8  28.1 27.5 26.8 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
3- Credit Aggregates  
  The credit aggregates indicators utilized here are the same as or 
diversified Arab economies namely, private sector credit as a percent of 
GDP, credit to the public sector to GDP and the monetary authority credit to 
the financial sector as a percent of total financial sector credit (see Table 7A, 
B & C). 
In the GCC countries, the private sector share in the total credit 
provided by the banking sector is generally higher than in the diversified 
Arab economies, but modest when compared with other developing 
countries, reflecting the limited role of the private sector in the economic 
activities and the dominant role of the public sector. For the most part, the 
share of credit to the private sector has been increasing since 1990 in all 
GCC counties and part of the private sector’s needs has been met either 
through borrowing from abroad or offshore banking.  
On the other hand, in the GCC the banking sector has been generally 
active in lending to the public sector, with Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
having the highest ratios. The large fiscal deficit that resulted from the Gulf  
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war and the subsequent decline in world oil prices as well as other factors 
such as the floating of government bonds to finance incentives to the 
agriculture sector in Saudi Arabia, the financing of the so-called “bad debt 
crises” in Kuwait and the financing of major gas and petrochemical 
development projects in Qatar are all typical reasons for increasing credit to 
the public sector. However, the public sector share of total credit provided 
by the banking system in the GCC has been declining since the early 1990s, 
from about 70 percent to about 40 percent in Kuwait and from 44 percent to 
33 percent in Qatar, which should be viewed as a significant post reform 
improvement.         
  The reliance of the banking sector in GCC countries on credit from 
monetary authorities is very low and decreasing over the time period, which 
is indicative of a low level of reliance on the central bank for their 
operations. While this ratio is higher in Saudi Arabia, about 4.5 percent, it 
was also declining over the time period, which is a post reform 
improvement.    
Table 7A. Credit Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000                (%) 
  1995  1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 
Credit to Private/Total Credit 
Bahrain  155.6 169.4 157.7  138.6 121.8 156.3 
Kuwait  32.2 42.4   50.8  53.6 55.5 59.9 
Oman  99.8   100.6 107.1  99.6 108.4 99.6 
Qatar  56.8   52.6   57.0  55.9 51.9 67.0 
Saudi Arabia  74.2   77.2   70.6  71.4 65.4 70.2 
United Arab Emirates  102.8  101.0 99.3  100.2 98.9 108.5 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
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Table 7B. Credit Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000           (%) 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000 
Credit to Public/Total Credit 
Bahrain  (55.6) (69.4)   (57.7) (38.6) (21.8) (56.3) 
Kuwait  67.8 57.6   50.2 46.4  44.5  40.1 
Oman  0.2   (0.6)   (7.1) 0.4  8.4  0.4 
Qatar  43.2   47.4   43 44.1 48.1  33 
Saudi Arabia  25.8   22.8   29.4 28.6  34.6  29.8 
United Arab Emirates  (2.8) (1.6)  0.7  (0.2)  1.1  (8.5) 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
 
 
Table 7C. Credit Indicators (GCC); 1995-2000                 (%) 
 
  1995  1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 
Credit from Central Bank/Total Credit 
Bahrain  - -   - -  -  - 
Kuwait  0.1 0   0.1 0.01 0  0.2 
Oman  -   -   - -  -  - 
Qatar  0.4   0.3   0.6 0.2  0.3  0.5 
Saudi Arabia  11.4   8.5   9.7 13.1  8.3 4.5 
United Arab Emirates  0.1 0.1 0.06 0.04  0.05  0.05 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
4- Stock Markets  
  Capital markets in GCC countries are also relatively new and rapidly 
expanding as the role of the private sector is increasing and the demand for 
equity investment is rising. Nevertheless, GCC equity markets are generally 
small when compared with other developing countries but larger when  
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compared with diversified Arab countries. By far the largest Arab equity 
market is in Saudi Arabia, with a capitalization of about 70 US$ billion, 
followed by Kuwait and Bahrain with about 27 and 6.3 US$ billion 
respectively (see Table 8A & B). 
However, Bahrain’s equity market comes first with respect to 
capitalization to GDP ratio (about 112 percent) followed by Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, value traded as a percent of GDP is highest in 
Kuwait (about 107 percent) followed by Saudi Arabia and Oman. 
 
  Table 8A. Capital Market Indicators in GCC; 1988-2001 
 
 1988  1997  2001 
Market Capitalization (US$ Million) 
Bahrain  1,964 7,826   6,384 
Kuwait  11,836 25,880   26,682 
Oman  692   7,108   3,202 
Saudi Arabia  22,940   59,386   69,621 
 
Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (% of GDP) 
Bahrain  46.8 135.2   112.1 
Kuwait  57.2 85.2   87.3 
Oman  8.5   54.0   33.7 










Table 8B. Capital Market Indicators in GCC; 1988-2001 
 
 1988  1997  2001 
Total Value Traded Ratio (% of GDP) 
Bahrain  2.3 8.1   15.7 
Kuwait  13.1 103.1   107.1 
Oman  2.9   29.4   22.4 
Saudi Arabia  5.4   12.7   28.5 
 
 
5. Other Important Features of the Arab Financial Sector  
  In general, Arab bank lending is predominantly short term and is 
heavily concentrated in traditional sectors, such as trade, construction and 
real estate. These sectors accounted for about 30-45 percent of the total Arab 
banks’ credit. Meanwhile, the industrial sector accounted for less than 10 
percent of total Arab credit. More importantly, non-performing loans in 
some countries pose a serious problem. For example, the non-performing 
loans constituted about 50% of total banks’ loans in Algeria, 46% in Yemen. 
31% in Tunisia, 20% in Egypt and 11% in Morocco, Shaker (2001).  
Furthermore, the GCC banking sector has recently experienced an 
unprecedented upsurge in consumer loans. The share of consumer loans in 
the portfolio of GCC banks reached 30 to 40 percent of total banking sector 
credit, which led central banks in the region to put caps on consumer loans. 
This trend mainly reflects the high demand for consumer loans to finance 
purchases of durable goods by an increasingly young and relatively wealthy 
population. It also reflects a rising involvement of the GCC banking sector 
in financing the purchasing of equities in the local stock market.      
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  One important group of banking services that have experienced rapid 
growth over the last ten years in almost all Arab countries are the Islamic 
financial services. The assets of Islamic banks and Islamic investment 
institution in Arab countries amounted to about US$ 80 billions at the end of 
the year 2000 (Shaker, 2001). Many Arab commercial banks have added 
Islamic accounts and banking services side with by side their regular 
banking operations. An increasing number of new Islamic investment 
institutions have been launched during the last five years, especially in the 
GCC countries. They tend to be focused on financing and leasing operations 
and also manage wide-ranging portfolios of equities in companies and 
business whose activities are compatible with Islamic rules. The major 
policy challenge currently facing monetary authorities in the Arab countries 
is how to bring these Islamic financial institutions, activities under the same 
supervision and regulation as imposed on regular commercial banks.  
  Furthermore, the financial sector in Arab countries suffers from high 
concentration in some countries and over banking in others. For example, 
the 25 largest Arab banks have about 59 percent of total assets, 46 percent of 
aggregate credit, 65 percent of aggregate deposits and 56 percent of equities. 
The banking sectors of six Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, 
Kuwait, Lebanon and Morocco, have about 75 percent of total assets and 80 
percent of deposits of all Arab banks. Furthermore, the largest three banks in 
Saudi Arabia have about 40 percent of  total assets and about 35 percent of 
the deposits.          
  On the other hand, there are about 74 banks in Lebanon while the 
Lebanese financial sector represents only 7 percent of total assets of the 
Arab financial sector. In Bahrain there are about 47 banks and in the UAE 
there are about 46 banks while their share in total Arab assets is not more  
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than 3 percent, while the eleven banks of Saudi Arabia represented about 25 
percent of total Arab assets.  
  For the most part, the recent years have witnessed a flare of activities 
in the area of merger and acquisition in the Arab banking sector in a bid to 
expand domestic and overseas markets. For example, in 1999, the Saudi 
American bank acquired the United Saudi bank to form the largest Arab 
bank. Moreover, Arab countries reviewed here have all established capital 
adequacy requirements that are stricter than those set under the Basle accord. 
In the area of prudential supervision, in general, all Arab central banks carry 
out on site scrutiny and off site analysis of banking sector financial 
performance and liquidity provisions. However, very few Arab central banks 
have issued guiding principles for bank management standards and even 
fewer have regulated and supervised non-banking financial institutions such 
as Islamic Banking, Mutual Fund and Investment and Brokerage institutions. 
International accounting standards, risk management standards and warning 
systems for early detection of banking crises exist only in a few Arab 
countries; mainly in the GCC countries, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. Finally, 
in recent years, some Arab countries have introduced deposit insurance 
schemes while others are in the preparation and implementation phases of 
introducing such schemes.    
IV. Conclusions 
  The implementation of financial reforms has already caused major 
improvements in monetary and credit aggregates in the banking sector in 
many Arab countries. However, there appear to be plenty of room for even 
more improvements over the next few years. It is highly likely that many 
Arab reforming countries would still experience declining currency to 
deposit ratios; would also experience a change from foreign to domestic  
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currency deposits; and a substitution away from short term banking deposits 
and liabilities to long term counterparts. Moreover, for Arab countries in 
their early phases of financial reforms such as Syria, Algeria and Yemen, the 
scope for structural improvements is even greater.   
  Financial reform in the Arab countries has definitely had a noticeable 
impact on the cost of intermediation as manifested by real interest rates and 
gross interest margins. However, there is scope for even more improvements 
over the next years as competition enhancing measures and administrative 
costs reduction interventions are further adopted.  
  In Arab countries, the banking sector is still mainly catering to the 
public sector. The existence of inherent biases against the private sector 
attaining banking credit should be amended. There is a need for the 
monetary authorities of these countries to strengthen and promote private 
sector activities and ensure that the public sector does not crowd it out. 
These challenges and reforms need to go hand in hand with structural 
reforms, including privatization, deregulation and liberalization, as well as 
sustained efforts to maintain financial stability through prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies and prudential supervision measures. There is also an 
urgent need to establish a central risk bureau in all Arab countries. 
  Finally, Arab stock markets remain largely underdeveloped, small and 
face various constraints. For the most part, corporate securities and 
secondary markets for government bonds have not emerged as significant 
vehicles for linking money and capital markets or as an engine for extending 
financial sector depth. Those can be revitalized by an acceleration of the 
privatization drive; supporting the structural changes in the banking sector in 
the period ahead and empowering the financial sector to effectively compete 
in the global economy.    
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